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Abstract

Through the momentum of the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which
was passed in 2001, Indonesia has officially adopted a dualistic judicial review system. Under such system, the
authority to conduct judicial review is divided/spread to the two judicial organs, each with its own scope of
review; namely, the Supreme Court/Mahkamah Agung reviews regulations below the level of Law (Undangundang), while the Constitutional Court/Mahkamah Konstitusi reviews the same against the Constitution
(constitutional review). Seen from the theoretical and practical perspective adhered to by states which adopt
the formation of the Constitutional Court (centered judicial review model), the system adopted by Indonesia
is uncommon, and moreover it could be considered as an error in designing the judicial review system. This is
in view of the fact that in states which have a Constitutional Court, the authority to conduct judicial review
is concentrated / centered upon the Constitutional Court. Such division of authority under the two review
regime (legal review and constitutional review) as practiced by Indonesia is not known (except for South
Korea), neither in states which use the centralized judicial review model nor in those which use the distribution
judicial review model. Such distribution is bound to disrupt the judicial review itself, as the authority to review
is implemented by two different institutions with different review standard. Accordingly, in the final part of
this research the author puts forward the proposition to centralize the authority to conduct judicial review in
the Constitutional Court thus putting an end to the practice of dualistic judicial review which has been proven
to be problematic and ensuring that the judicial review system in Indonesia can be reconstructed and placed
upon the correct theoretical and practical basis.
Keywords: 1945 Constitution, dualism, judicial review, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court
Abstrak
Melalui momentum Perubahan Ketiga UUD 1945 yang disahkan pada tahun 2001, Indonesia secara resmi
mengadopsi sistem judicial review yang bersifat dualistik (dualisme judicial review). Dengan sistem yang
dualistik ini, kewenangan judicial review menyebar/terbagi kepada dua organ yudisial dengan memisahkan
cakupan pengujiannya masing-masing: Mahkamah Agung menguji peraturan di bawah undang-undang
terhadap undang-undang (legal review) sementara Mahkamah Konstitusi menguji undang-undang terhadap
UUD (constitutional review). Ditinjau dari perspektif teori dan praktek yang dianut oleh negara-negara yang
mengadopsi pembentukan Mahkamah Konstitusi (model judicial review yang terpusat), sistem yang dianut
oleh Indonesia itu ternyata sangat tidak lazim dan bahkan merupakan sebuah kekeliruan dalam merancang
sistem judicial review. Sebab di negara-negara yang memiliki Mahkamah Konstitusi, kewenangan judicial
review itu pasti akan dikonsentrasikan/dipusatkan kepada Mahkamah Konstitusi. Pembagian kewenangan ini
ke dalam dua rezim pengujian (legal review dan constitutional review) sebagaimana dipraktekan di Indonesia
tidak pernah dikenal (kecuali di Korea Selatan) baik di lingkungan negara-negara yang menggunakan model
judicial review yang terpusat maupun model judicial review yang tersebar. Sebab pembagian yang demikian
akan mengacaukan pelaksanaan judicial review itu sendiri lantaran kewenangan itu akan dilaksanakan oleh
dua lembaga yang berbeda dengan menggunakan standar pengujian yang juga berbeda. Untuk itu pada
bagian akhir penelitian ini dikemukakan sebuah proposisi untuk memusatkan kewenangan judicial review
kepada Mahkamah Konstitusi agar praktek dualisme judicial review yang terbukti bermasalah itu dapat
diakhir dan sistem judicial review di Indonesia dapat direkonstruksi dan ditempatkan pada landasan teori
dan praktek yang tepat.
Kata Kunci: UUD 1945, dualisme, judicial review, mahkamah agung, mahkamah konstitusi
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I. INTRODUCTION

HAMID CHALID

Judicial review in general could be translated as the mechanism to review
legislation carried out by judges in order to ensure its coherence/compliance towards
legal rules of higher hierarchy which ordinarily culminate in the Constitution. To
complete the understanding of the judicial review as briefly defined above, below is
the definition of judicial review given by Henry J. Abraham:1
“The Power of court (ordinary or special court) to hold unconstitutional and
hence unenforceable any law, any official action based upon a law, or any other
action by public official that it deems ...... to be in conflict with the basic law
(constitution).”2

The definition of judicial review as stated above is important in order to differentiate
it from a similar but slightly different term, that is, the term “constitutional review.”3

In the global stream of thought, scholars are indeed not making a distinction
between the two terms, which is because in many countries general judicial review
is aimed to examine the consistency of various legislations towards the constitution
(constitutional review), and ordinarily, there is no dualism in terms of the competent
institution that conducts judicial review along with constitutional review.4 Accordingly,
it can be concluded that the body authorized to conduct judicial review also holds
the function of constitutional review. It means that, on a global scale, an essential
difference between the terms judicial review and constitutional review can hardly
be found. The definition of constitutional review can be found in judicial review,
because the content and purpose of judicial review is none other than reviewing the
constitutionality of various laws that are allegedly contrary to the constitution.5 That
is why in foreign literature judicial review is often equated or identified with the term
constitutional review.
However, in countries such as Indonesia which adopts the dualism of judicial review,

1
Henry J. Abraham is the Professor of Constitutional Law (Emeritus) at the University of Virginia, the
United States. He has specialized in and has written works on judiciary, constitutional law, judicial review,
as well as other constitutional law issues, has published thirteen books and hundreds of articles.
2
Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process: an Introductory of the Court of the United States, England, and
France (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.280.
3
One of the scholars who discuss the difference between the meaning of ‘judicial review’ and ‘constitutional review’ is Jimly Asshiddiqie. To learn more about the differences between the two terms, see
further in Jimly Asshiddiqie, Model-Model Pengujian Konstitusional di Berbagai Negara [Models of Constitutional Review in Various Countries], 2nd ed. (Sinar Grafika: Jakarta, 2010), pp.2-7
4
The object of judicial review in many countries usually covers the entire legislation in the related
country ranging from Acts, Executive Acts, or other forms of legislation (secondary legislation). In fact, in
several countries such as Taiwan, Chile, and South Africa, the object of judicial review also includes the
provisions of amended constitution, whereby the procedure of amendment is reviewed to assess whether
or not it is constitutional (formal judicial review). In the case of Taiwan, see Art. 78 of Taiwan Constitution, for Chile refer to Art. 93 Chilean Constitution, and for South Africa see Art. 167 of the South African
Constitution.
5
The tendencies of foreign scholars who equate and identify the term ‘judicial review’ and ‘constitutional review’ can be seen from the definition of judicial review as proposed by C. Neal Tate. According to
his definition, “judicial review is the means by which a court determines the acceptability of a given law or
other official action on grounds of compatibility with constitutional forms.” From the said short definition
it is evident that Tate views judicial review as the process to assure the conformity of various legislation
towards the constitution (constitutional review). In other words, in Tate’s view judicial review is the same
as constitutional review. See C. Neal Tate in Danielle E. Finck, “Judicial Review: the United States Supreme
Court versus the German Constitutional Court,” Boston College International and Comparative Law Review,
Vol. 20, No. 1, (December 1997): 123.
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where the jurisdiction of judicial review is divided into two jurisdictions of review,
namely judicial review of the constitutionality of law (constitutional review) and
judicial review of the legality of regulations (legal review), the difference between the
terms judicial review and constitutional review becomes highly significant.6 The term
judicial review in the Indonesian context does not include aspects of constitutional
review7, hence it is clear that in the Indonesian context the terms judicial review and
constitutional review cannot be equated and switched.8

As mentioned above, Indonesia adopts the dualism of judicial review. According to
the Constitution, the authority to conduct judicial review is granted to two different
judicial bodies, namely the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.9 The Supreme
Court conducts review legislation of lower hierarchy against the relevant laws (legal
review).10 At the same time, the Constitutional Court is vested with the authority to
review laws against the Constitution (constitutional review).11 The division of judicial
review into two review regimes is what the writer refers to as the “dualism of judicial
review”.
The dualism of judicial review as adopted by Indonesia is considered very unusual
when viewed from a theoretical and comparative perspective. In other countries
which also adopt the judicial review system, the authority would be centered /
concentrated on the Constitutional Court (centralized judicial review) if it is not
granted to the Supreme Court and other judicial bodies under it (decentralized
judicial review).12 In a theoretical and comparative perspective, once the authority
is granted to the Supreme Court such as the model in the United States, or to the
Constitutional Court such as the Austrian model, the authority is be fully granted to
the mentioned institutions, in the sense that there is no further divisibility, subject or
object of review as the case in Indonesia.13
Therefore it appears that, seen from the theoretical and empirical point of view,
there is a difference between the judicial review system developed in Indonesia (with
the dualism of judicial review system) and the system of judicial review commonly
adopted by many countries around the world.14

The difference or rather unusual practice of judicial review dualism as illustrated
above will be one of the main subjects in this research. This study will also review the
reasons or factors that led to the adoption of Indonesia’s dualism of judicial review
See Asshiddiqie, Model-model Pengujian Konstitusional, pp.6-7.
In the term judicial review the emphasis is on the institution / subject who is authorized to undertake such review, namely the judge / court. Meanwhile, in the term constitutional review the emphasis is
on the activity, namely the process of reviewing the consistency of a legislation vis-à-vis the constitution.
8
Asshiddiqie, Model-model Pengujian Konstitusional
9
See Art. 24A para (1) and Art. 24C paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic
of Indonesia
10
See Art. 24A para (1) Ibid.
11
See Art. 24C para (1) Ibid.
12
See further explanation on the decentralized and centralized judicial review in Mauro Cappelleti,
The Judicial Process in Comperative Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp.132-149.
13
Refer to the explanation on judicial review in general in countries that have institutionalized it,
using the decentralized judicial review or centralized judicial review, in Donald L. Horowitz, “Constitutional Courts: Opportunities and Pitfalls,” http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/E24ConstitutionalCourtsOppsPitfallsHorowitz.pdf, accessed on September 18, 2016.
14
Also look at the same opinion on this matter in , “Pengujian Konstitusional (Constitutional Review)
di Indonesia [Constitutional Review in Indonesia],” http://equityjusticia.blogspot.co.id/2015/02/pengujian-konstitusional-di-indonesia.html, accessed on September 18, 2016.
6
7
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system and the problems surrounding it. The end of this research will present the
idea or proposition to centralize/concentrate the judicial review authority to the
Constitutional Court, along with all the reasons and considerations.15
II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. A Short History and the Origin of Judicial Review

Judicial review as we know it today actually originates from the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in the Marbury v. Madison case in 1803. Since then the “outbreak”
of judicial review has begun to spread and finally gained important positions in the
world of law as it is today.16

The case began when James Madison, the new Secretary of State in the Thomas
Jefferson administration, held back the copy of the letter of appointment of a few
justice of peace that had been made and stamped by the previous President John
Adams with the help of the former Secretary of State, John Marshall.17 The signing
of the letter was done in the final seconds before the presidential transition from
John Adams to the new President Thomas Jefferson, in the night of April the 3rd,
1801 to the dawn of March the 4th, 1801.18 Some of the names that were included
in the appointment letter are William Marbury,19 Denis Ramsay, Robert Townsend,
and William Harper.20It can be said that the signing of the appointment letter is only
administrative, because procedurally, the terms and conditions of the appointment
had already been fulfilled prior to that. For example, it had received the approval of
the Senate and so on.21
The copy of the letter of appointment was not handed over to the person concerned
in time as it should have been done because the subsequent day, March 4, 1801 was
15
A similar opinion on this matter, which is the idea to concentrate and centralize the judicial review
authority to the Constitutional Court was also raised by Janpatar Simamora. However, the idea is ultimately
the same, namely proposing centralization of the judicial review authority to the Constitutional Court but
the idea departs from a very different base point respectively. While Simamora departs from empirical
facts about the ineffectiveness of the implementation of judicial review at the Supreme Court, thus putting
forward the argument for transferring and centralizing the authority to the Constitutional Court, the writer
departs from theoretical, historical, and comparative facts related to the disorder of the judicial review
system thus arguing for the need to concentrate the authority around the Constitutional Court and remove
the dualism of judicial review system. For further reference on Simamora’s said ideas refer to Janpatar
Simamora, “Considering Centralization of Judicial Review Authority in Indonesia Constitutional System,”
International Organization of Scientific Research of Humanities And Social Science 21, no. 2 (February 2016),
pp.26-32.
16
Finck, “Judicial Review”, p.151.
17
William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Revised and Update (New York: Vintage Books – Random
House, 2002), pp.21-22.
18
Jimly Asshiddiqie, “Sejarah Constitutional Review dan Gagasan Pembentukan MK [the History of
Constitutional Review and the Idea of the Formation of Indonesian Constitutional Court],” http://jimlyschool.com/read/analisis/276/sejarah-constitutional-review-gagasan-pembentukan-mk/, Accessed 20
September 2016
19

Finck, “Judicial Review”, p.151.
William Marbury himself was appointed as the Justice of Peace for the Washington D.C. area.
Since the appointment letter was signed and stamped in the final seconds before the Presidential
transition from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (March 4, 1801), William Marbury and his friends were
later nick-named the “midnight judges.” See Rehnquist, The Supreme Court, pp. 26-27.
20
21

Jimly Asshiddiqie, “Sejarah Constitutional Review”
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the day of presidential transition from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson. Eventually
the letters were held in the presidential office by the new Secretary of State, James
Madison.22 Madison held back the letter because it was deemed irrelevant to be
handed over to the above mentioned names since the president had changed from
John Adams to Thomas Jefferson.23

On the other hand, Marbury and others thought their appointment process was
constitutional, thus they did not simply accept Madison’s decision to hold the letter.
Consequently, in March 1801, Marbury through his attorney Charles Lee (Former
Federal Attorney General) filed a lawsuit to the Federal Supreme Court under section
13 of the Judiciary Act 1789, issued the Writs of Mandamus24 in order for the Federal
Government to hand over the copy of the letter of appointment.25
After going through a long process with strong resistance from Thomas Jefferson’s
government and the Congress supporting them, the Supreme Court under John
Marshall handed down a decision upon the case in February, 1803.26
In the decision, the US Supreme Court rejected Marbury’s request that the
Supreme Court issue a Writs of Mandamus under the Judiciary Act 1789. Instead,
the Supreme Court judged the provisions of the Judicial Act 1789 as the basis for the
Marbury’s request to be incompatible and contrary to Article III Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution.27 That is why the Supreme Court could not grant the petition and instead
cancelled Judiciary Act 1789 because it was considered unconstitutional.28

It was then from that verdict that the judicial review mechanism was discovered
and developed in the practice of American law. The U.S. Supreme Court has undertaken
legal breakthroughs and legal discovery (rechtsvinding) at an extraordinary level
that eventually gave rise to an entirely new system, not only in the United States but
throughout the world. Whereas at the time the ruling was made, there was not a single
article of the U.S. Constitution which authorizes the Supreme Court to annul a law on
the basis of being contradictory to the constitution.29
In taking this phenomenal decision, Chief Justice John Marshall put forward three

Rehnquist, The Supreme Court, pp. 26-27.
See Asshiddiqie, Model-Model Pengujian Konstitusional, p.17.
24
The Writ of Mandamus itself in the legal system of the United States can be interpreted as a warrant
issued by the Supreme Court to certain state bodies, including the Government, to do or not to do something
that becomes its legal obligation. See further explanation on Writ of Mandamus, one of them in Wikipedia,
Mandamus, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandamus.
25
Under the Judiciary Act 1789, the case filed by Marbury belongs to the original jurisdiction of the
US Supreme Court, this means its submission does not need to go through a court of a lower position. See
the explanation of this matter in Laica Marzuki in Zainal Arifin Hoessein, Judicial Review di Mahkamah
Agung: Tiga Dekade Pengujian Peraturan Perundang-undangan [Judicial Review in the Supreme Court: Three
Decades of Review of Laws and Regulations], Second Print. (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2013), p. viii.
26
Arief Ainul Yaqin, “Sejarah Judicial Review (Kasus Marbury versus Madison 1803) [The History
of Judicial Review (The Marbury v. Madison Case 1803),” http://equityjusticia.blogspot.co.id/2014/11/
sejarah-judicial-review-kasus-marbury.html, accessed on September 22, 2016.
27
The provisions of the 1789 Judiciary Act were judged to be contrary to the United States Constitution because it violated the principle of separation of powers and the limitations of the authority of the
U.S. Supreme Court as outlined in Article III Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.. See Finck, “Judicial Review”,
pp.139-141.
28
Jimly Asshiddiqie, Model-Model Pengujian Konstitusional, p.20.
29
Victor Ferreres Comella, “The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review In a Special
Court: Some Thoughts on Judicial Activism,” SELA (Seminario en Latinoamérica de Teoría Constitucional
y Política) Paper, p.28, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yls_sela/39, accessed on September 22, 2016.
22
23
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arguments. Firstly, the judge vows to uphold the constitution, so that if any regulations
are deemed to be contradictory to the constitution, the judge shall examine such
law. Secondly, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, so there must be an
opportunity to test the existing rules under it in order to ensure that the contents
of the constitution are not violated. Thirdly, the judge can not refuse a case so that if
anyone submits a judicial review request, the request must be fulfilled.30

Thus, the above is a glimpse of the history of judicial review derived from the
phenomenal decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1803, John Marshall as Chief
Justice.31 Although at first the ruling received reactions, controversies, even slander
from many parties, the decision was ultimately accepted in the legal system of the
United States.32
The practice that occurred in the United States in 1803 was then talked about and
debated amongst lawyers, not only in the United States, but around the world.33 Until
ultimately the system became studied, absorbed, and practiced by many countries in
the world with their own customization and modification.34
B. Two Main Models of Judicial Review: Which One is Adopted by Indonesia ?

The mechanism of judicial review, which was first discovered in the United States
in 1803, has now become widespread and has been adopted by many countries in the
world.35 Up until now, at least more than three-quarters of all countries in the world
have adopted judicial review in their constitutional system.36
Based on such widespread dissemination throughout the world, experts have

30
John Marshall in Mahfud M. D., Perdebatan Hukum Tata Negara Pasca Amandemen Konstitusi [Constitutional Law Debate Following the Amendment of the Constitution], (Jakarta: PT. Raja Grafindo Persada,
2010), p.99.
31
The “Marbury vs Madison” ruling is so phenomenal and extraordinary, William H. Rehnquist
referred to the case as the “most famous case ever decided by the U.S. Supreme Court”. See Rehnquist, The
Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is (New York: William Marrow, 1989), p. 114.
32
Finck, “Judicial Review”, pp.132-133.
33
Regarding the waves of the spreading idea of judicial review that originated from the U.S. Supreme
Court Decision in 1803, Tom Ginsburg grouped it into three (3) waves. The First Wave., occurred in the
period shortly after the emergence of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision which has spawned the practice of
judicial review; The Second Wave, occurred in the 20th century marked by the establishment of the first
Constitutional Court in the world on the initiative of Hans Kelsen in 1920 in Austria and subsequent periods, including post-World War II where judicial review began to be widely adopted by European countries
with the centralized judicial review model or Kelsenian Model; The Third wave occurred around the decade
of the 1990s up to the present time. The spread of judicial review in the third wave originally took place
in the Eastern European region after the collapse of the communist regime and then continued until the
early 21st century when the judicial review institution was also adopted by newly transitioning countries
from authoritarian regime to democratic regime, this is when Indonesia institutionalized judicial review /
constitutional review through the establishment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia
in 2003. See Tom Ginsburg, “The Global Spread of Constitutional Review,” in Keith E. Whittington et.al., The
Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.81-98.
34
See Cappelleti, The Judicial Process, pp.132-135.
35
Regarding the phenomenon of the globally spreading judicial review, Tom Ginsburg expresses the
words: “From its origins in the American experience, the institution has spread around the globe to become
part of the standard institutional architecture of democracy.” See Tom Ginsburg, “Comparative Constitutional
Review,” http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/files/constitutional_review.pdf accessed on September 22, 2016.
36
Donald L. Horowitz, “Constitutional Courts: A Primer For Decision Makers,“ Journal of Democracy
17, No. 4 (October 2006), p. 125.
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been trying to find and identify some common models of judicial review mechanisms
that have been applied by many countries.37 As a result, the world’s constitutional law
experts agree that there are at least two major models of judicial review developed
and adopted by various countries, namely: (i) decentralized judicial review; and (ii)
centralized judicial review.38
The classification of the judicial review system into two models as mentioned above
is based on the criteria for institutionalizing or granting the authority of judicial review
to the authorized bodies; whether by disseminating it to all existing conventional
judiciary bodies and culminating in the Supreme Court, or by concentrating it on a
specific body called the Constitutional Court.39

When the institutionalization of judicial review is carried out in a diffused
manner to the Supreme Court and to all judicial courts beneath it, it is referred to
as the decentralized judicial review model. This model was pioneered by the United
States and has been generally followed by common law countries.40 Meanwhile, when
the institutionalization of judicial review is done centrally to a specific organ like
the Constitutional Court, it is referred to as the centralized judicial review model.41
The pioneer of this model is Austria.42 This model is commonly followed by other
Continental European countries as well as countries outside Europe that generally
adhere to the civil law tradition.43 In this respect, Mauro Cappelleti states as follows:
“The decentralized (or American) system gives all the judicial organs within
it power to determinate the constitutionality of legislation. In contrast, the
centralized (or Austrian) system confines this power to a single judicial organ.”44

To learn more about the features or characteristics of each judicial review model
and to answer the question as to which model is actually embraced by Indonesia, it is
further elaborated in the subsequent section.
1. Decentralized Judicial Review

This model of judicial review is often also referred to as the American Model. The
name has been given quite reasonably since the system was born in and has been
developed by the United States since 1803.45

Yaqin, “Model-Model Judicial Review”
One of the experts who proposes the theory of judicial review classification into decentralized and
centralized models is Mauro Cappelleti. In his book entitled “The Judicial Process Comperative Perspective”
Cappelleti discusses the two main models of judicial review in separate sub-chapters and discusses them in
sufficient detail. For a complete overview, refer to Cappelleti, The Judicial Process, pp.132-149.
39
Ibid., pp.136-137.
40
Ibid., pp.133-135.
41
Victor Ferreres Comella, “The European Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation: Toward
Decentralization?,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 2, No. 3 (July-October 2004), p. 464.
42
The institutionalization of judicial review under this centralized model can not be separated from
the role of Hans Kelsen, a prominent jurist of the 20th century of Austrian origin. He was the very person
who contributed to the formation of the Constitutional Court of Austria in 1920, which is also the first
Constitutional Court in the world.
43
The explanation regarding the question as to why the American model is followed and is much
more suitable for commom law countries, and why the Austrian model is followed and appears to be much
more suitable for civil law countries can be found in Mauro Cappelleti, “Judicial Review in Comparative
Perspective,” California Law Review 58, Issue 5 (October 1970), pp. 1039-1050.
44
Cappelleti, The Judicial Process”, pp.132-133.
45
See Martin Boroswki, “The Beginnings of Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court,” Journal Ratio
37
38
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As mentioned above, the main feature of the decentralized judicial review model
that distinguishes it from the centralized model is that all courts at each level are
authorized to conduct judicial review. As confirmed by Vicki Jackson and Mark
Tushnet, namely as follows:
“A key characteristic of this model is that the jurisdiction to engage in
constitutional interpretation is not limited to a single court. It can be exercised
by many courts, state, and federal, and is seen ad inherent to and an ordinary
incident of the more general process of case adjudication.”46

In addition to the basic features mentioned above, there are some features other
than the typical judicial review of this model that distinguishes it from the centralized
model. The features in question are as follows:
a. The review process is not a stand-alone process solely conducted for the
purpose of carrying out judicial review, but rather a relation to it and done
conjunctionally with a concrete investigation that is taking place in the court.
In other words, in this model the law review activity is a judicial activity
conducted separately from the litigation process taking place in court.47
In such process, when the judge reviews regulations that are contrary to
the Constitution he is also conducting judicial review of the regulations in
question at the same time.48
b. In connection with the above description of its characteristics, judicial
review in this model is classified as a concrete judicial review or concrete
review. That is, the judicial review process can only be undertaken if the
constitutionality of a legal norm arises or is related to a concrete case that
is taking place in court.49
c. This model does not recognize the abstract review mechanism.50
d. The judge’s decision regarding judicial review case only applies to the
parties involved in the litigation process which became the origin of the
judicial review case. It means that the binding power of a judge’s decision
in judicial review is only inter partes, rather than erga omnes.51
As a closing statement on judicial review of this model it needs to be noted that in
practice this model has been widespread and adopted by many countries in different
parts of the world, especially countries which share the common law tradition.52 The

Juris 16, no. 2 (June 2003), pp.179-180.
46
Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law, Second Edition (New York: Foundation Press, 2006), p.465.
47
See Alon Harel dan Adam Shinar, “Between Judicial and Legislative Supremacy: A Cautious Defense
of Constrained Judicial Review,” International Journal of Comparative Constitutional Law, Vol. 10, No. 4, (October 2012), pp.951-952.
48
See I Gede Dewa Palguna, Pengaduan Konstitusional (Constitutional Complaint); Upaya Hukum
terhadap Pelanggaran Hak-Hak Konstitusional Warga Negara [Constitutional Complaint; Legal Recourse
against Violations of Citizens’ Constitutional Rights], (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2013), p.328.
49
See Mauro Cappelleti, Judicial Process .... Op. Cit., pp.136-137.
50
Ibid.
51
Formally, the judge’s verdict in judicial review case is only interpartes or in other words it is only
binding on the parties involved in the case, but in practice the verdict still has a binding force widely
recognized by the principle of precedent (stare decisis) prevailing in the country - decentralized judicial
review countries are usually common law countries. Guided by the principle of precedent (stare decisis),
every judge’s decision, including in cases of judicial review, is to be followed by other judges so that the
verdict will eventually apply in general as well. See Mauro Cappelleti, Ibid., pp.138-142.
52
The explanation as to why this decentralized judicial review model is more suitable to be adopted
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countries in question are from Europe, among others: Denmark, Ireland, Norway and
Sweden. African countries adopting the said model include Botswana, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, and Tanzania. In Middle East Iran and
Israel apply the above model. Asian countries include Bangladesh, Fiji, India, Japan,
Philippines, Malaysia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, and
Tibet. At the same time, in Latin America the said model is adopted by countries such
as Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, and Dominica.53
2. Centralized Judicial Review

Similar to the decentralized judicial review model which is often associated with
the birth of this model, this judicial review model is often referred to as the “Austrian
Model” or frequently as the “Kelsenian Model.”54 It is in reference to the name of the
initiator of this model who is none other than Hans Kelsen.55

As noted above, the main feature of this model which distinguishes it from the
decentralized model lies in the way of the institutionalization, or granting centralized
authority by forming a special organ outside the Supreme Court commonly referred
to as the Constitutional Court (or other similar names).56
In addition to the above mentioned features, there are some other characteristics
or distinctive features of centralized judicial review model which set it apart from the
decentralized model. Such features include the following:
a. The review process is conducted in a specific way and stands alone as a
process of constitutional adjudication that is solely aimed at implementing
judicial review (not mixed with case examination like in ordinary courts as
applicable in decentralized systems).57

b. Reviews in this model include concrete reviews and abstract reviews. Unlike
the previous model (decentralized model), which is limited to concrete
reviews only.58
c. The decision of the Constitutional Court in a judicial review case is binding
on all persons and all state bodies. In other words, the decision of the
Constitutional Court is erga omnes.59

Although this model emerged and developed much later than the American model,
in 1920, with the establishment of the Austrian Constitutional Court as the first
by countries which adopt the common law law system and why it is unsuitable to be applied in countries
which follow the civil law system can be seen in Alec Stone Sweet, “Why Europe Rejected American Judicial
Review and Why it May Not Matter,” Faculty Scholarship Series, Yale Law School, New Haven, 2003.
53
Asshiddiqie, Model-Model Pengujian Konstitusional, p.83.
54
See Sara Lagi, “Hans Kelsen and the Austrian Constitutional Court (1918-1929),” Revista Co-herencia 9, no. 16 (January-June 2012). p.273.
55
Ibid.
56
Comella, “The European Model”, n. 42.
57
In literature, this sort of reviewing mechanism is also called the “principaliter” method. It means
that the process of review is conducted specifically and independently, rather than simultaneously with
the examination of a case in an ordinary court as applicable in a decentralized judicial review system.
See for further explanation of this “principaliter” judicial review mechanism in Fatmawati, Hak Menguji
(Toetsingsrecht) yang Dimiliki Hakim in Sisitem Hukum Indonesia [The Right of Judges to Conduct Review
(Toetsingrecht) in Indonesia’s Legal System], (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 2005), pp.37-38.
58
Comella, “The European Model”, p.464.
59
See Cappelleti, The Judicial Process, pp.138-142.
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Constitutional Court in the world it became much more popular and has gained more
followers than the former.60 As stated by Jimly Asshiddiqie, based on the results of his
research on Constitutions from countries around the world, up to 2005 alone there
were at least 78 countries that have formend a Constitutional Court or other similar
body. It means that the centralized judicial review model has been followed / adopted
by 78 countries.61 The authors also believe that the number will continue to grow
along with the wider influence and appeal of this judicial review system.62
3. The Model Adopted by Indonesia

After discussing the two main models of judicial review as described above, it
raises the question: which model is adopted by Indonesia?

Using the reference of the characteristics of the two models of judicial review,
it can be stated that in principle Indonesia adopts the centralized judicial review
model.63 It can be proved first and foremost from the way the institutionalization
of judicial review is undertaken by forming the Constitutional Court of the Republic
of Indonesia.64 Similarly, other characteristics of the centralized model as described
above have also been fulfilled by Indonesia.

However, the construction of centralized judicial review embraced by Indonesia
seems to be “confused” with the fact that there is a dualism of judicial review.
Therefore, in principle, Indonesia adopts centralized judicial review model through
the nation’s constitutional choice to establish the Constitutional Court as an
institution to be assigned the duty and authority to carry out the judicial review of
the constitutional review.65 On the other hand, the authority of judicial review given
by the 1945 Constitution to the Constitutional Court is not given fully, in the sense that
it is not really concentrated only on the Constitutional Court. Because as we know,
according to the 1945 Constitution, in addition to the Constitutional Court there is
60
See Tom Ginsburg, “The Global Spread of Constitutional Review,” in Keith E. Whittington et.al., The
Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.81-98.
61
Jimly Asshiddiqie dan Mustafa Fakhry, Mahkamah Konstitusi: Kompilasi Ketentuan UUD, UndangUndang, dan Peraturan tentang Mahkamah Konstitusi di 78 Negara [The Constitutional Court: Compilation
of Provisions of the Constitution, Laws and Regulations on the Constitutional Court in 78 Countries] (Jakarta:
PSHTN FH UI, 2003).
62
The author’s belief is not without reason. Moreover, it seems that not only writers are optimistic
about the spread and development of this judicial review, in this case judicial review with the centralized
model. Long ago Mauro Cappelleti has been aware of the rapidity of the development and adoption of this
judicial review institution. He stated that the judicial review originally discovered and practiced in America
(for the decentralized model) and in Austria (for the centralized model) has now developed and spread far
beyond the boundaries of the region and the tradition from which it originated. See Cappelleti, The Judicial
Process., p.133.
63
The same opinion on this matter, stating beforehand that Indonesia has adopted the model of centralized judicial review, is also stated by Donald L. Horowitz. In this respect, he said that “ ..... Indonesia have
followed the original Austrian model, devised after World War I, by creating a separate constitutional court
in which the power to review legislative and governmental action resides.” See Horowitz, “Constitutional
Courts”, p.3.
64
See Art. 24C paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia, one
of the provisions sets out that the Constitutional Court has the authority to review Laws (Undang-undang)
against the Constitution.
65
The Constitutional Court’s main task since it was first conceived in the discussion of amendments
to the 1945 Constitution was intended to carry out judicial review of laws against the Constitution. See Pan
Mohammad Faiz, “The Protection of Civil and Political Rights by The Constitutional Court of Indonesia,”
Indonesia Law Review 6, no. 2 (May-August 2016), p. 159.
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also the Supreme Court which is authorized to conduct judicial review.66 The two
judicial bodies referred to by the 1945 Constitution are indeed granted the authority
of judicial review with their respective jurisdictional materials that differ from each
other: (i) The Supreme Court examines laws of lower hierarchy under the legislation
which is allegedly against it or judicial review on the legality of regulations (legal
review); and (ii) the Constitutional Court has the authority to examine the law against
the constitution or constitutional review.67
In other words, the 1945 Constitution separates or rather divides the judicial
review system into two reviewing systems:

1. The examination of Law against the Constitution (constitutional review)
with the authority for review being vested in the Constitutional Court; and

2. Reviewing legislation under the law (legal review) with the authority for
review being vested in the Supreme Court.68

The reality is that Indonesia is rather unusual and unique as it divides the judicial
review system into two reviewing systems. It is distinctive from the judicial review
system (Austrian Model) in general, which does not recognize the existence of such
dualism.69

Based on the foregoing, the conclusion that the author can point out is that
Indonesia adopts a “rather distorted” model of centralized judicial review and is
inconsistent with the general principles and patterns that apply globally in the
centralized judicial review system itself. In this case, on the one hand Indonesia
has adopted the establishment of the Constitutional Court the basic idea of which
is to concentrate all activities and authority of judicial review (both constitutional
and legal review) on one body.70 On the other hand, however, Indonesia has divided
66
Zainal Arifin Hoessein, Judicial Review di Mahkamah Agung: Tiga Dekade Pengujian Peraturan Perundang-undangan [Judicial Review at the Supreme Court: Three Decades of Reviewing Laws and Regulations], Second print (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2013), p.18.
67
Arief Ainul Yaqin, “Pengujian Konstitusional (constitutional review) di Indonesia,” [Constitutional
Review in Indonesia], Loc. Cit.
68
For further understanding of the concept of the division of review into what is constitutionally
called (the law against the Constitution) and reviewing the legality (regulation under the law against the
law) can be see further in Jimly Asshiddiqie, Model-Model Pengujian ....., Op. Cit., pp.6-7. See also Jimly Asshiddiqie, Hukum Acara Pengujian Undang-Undang, [Procedural Law for Judicial Review], Second Edition,
First Print (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2010), pp.1-34.
69
Based on the results of research conducted by the author on various countries which adopt the
centralized judicial review model (states which have Constitutional Court), it has been found that outside
Indonesia there is only one country which embraces the dualism of judicial review system as applicable in
Indonesia, namely South Korea. Based on Article 107 of South Korean Constitution it is stipulated that the
judicial review authority is divided into two reviewing regimes: (i) the judicial review authority of the law
against the constitution is vested in the South Korean Constitutional Court; and (ii) reviewing regulations
under the laws (regulations and decisions) and or against the constitution of its competence is vested in
the South Korean Supreme Court. Bearing in mind, however, that in South Korea all types of judicial review
can only be conducted in the framework of concrete reviews, unlike the abstract reviews as applicable in
Indonesia.
70
According to Hans Kelsen’s basic idea of establishing the Constitutional Court it is intended that
the authority of judicial review of all rules and legal norms be centered on one body (the Constitutional
Court). On this subject, Hans Kelsen states as follows: “The application of the constitutional rules concerning
legislation can be effectively guaranteed only if an organ other than legislative body is entrusted with the task
of testing whether a law is constitutional, and of annulling it if – according to the opinion of this organ – it’s
‘unconstitutional.’ There may be a special organ established for this purpose, for instance a special court, a so
called ‘constitutional court.” See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russel & Russel,

Volume 7 Number 3, September - December 2017 ~ INDONESIA Law Review

~ 378 ~

HAMID CHALID

judicial review authority into two reviewing systems implemented by two different
judicial bodies (Mahkamah Konstitusi and Mahkahmah Agung) which obscures the
centralized concept and system.

At this point, consciously or not, we have begun to detect the problems and the
unconventionality of the judicial review dualism system prevailing in Indonesia, at
least from a theoretical and comparative point of view. As a result of this dualism of
judicial review, theoretically we have difficulties in identifying which judicial review
model is adopted by Indonesia. While the discussion on judicial review models is not
merely a view from the theoretical dimension, it can be used as a theoretical point of
view in order to build and develop a reliable and established judicial review system in
accordance with its model, whether it is decentralized or centralized judicial review.71
C. Dualism of Judicial Review in Indonesia: Problems and Solutions

1. History and Reason Behind the Institutionalization of Dualism of Judicial
Review
If carefully traced with a historical approach, this system of judicial review dualism
is a new system in the history of Indonesian state administration adopted through the
third amendment of the 1945 Constitution in 2001.72 Prior to that, the original 1945
Constitution contained no provisions dealing with the issue of authority for judicial
review.73

Prior to the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the institution of judicial review
had been known and adopted by Indonesia since 1970.74 However, its regulation was
not based on the Constitution and was only regulated in Law No. 14 of 1970 on the
Principles of Judicial Power.75 The institution of judicial review adopted in 1970 was
1961), p.157.
71
Victor Ferrera, The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review In a Special Court: Some
Thoughts on Judicial Activism,” SELA (Seminario en Latinoamérica de Teoría Constitucional y Política) Paper,
p.28, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yls_sela/39, accessed on September 22, 2016.
72
The Third Amendment of the 1945 Constitution was ratified by the People’s Consultative Assembly
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR)) in the MPR’s 2001 Annual Assembly held from November 1-9,
2001.
73
Regarding the fact that the original 1945 Constitution does not recognize and does not adopt the
judicial review system, Sri Soemantri states the following words: “Of all the provisions contained in the
1945 Constitution and its elucidation, there is no provision for judicial review. There is not even a hint that
implies judicial review. “See Sri Soemantri, Hak Uji Material di Indonesia [The Right for Substantive Review
in Indonesia], Second Edition, First Print (Bandung: Alumni, 1997), p.71.
74
If we look back further, the judicial review institution was also known and adopted in Indonesia,
namely during the United Republic of Indonesia (RIS) in 1949-1950. At that time, the judicial review institution was adopted by the Constitution of RIS 1949, through Articles 156-158. Based on the articles of
the 1949 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, there is a constitutional review of the regional laws
(states) for which the authority rests with the Supreme Court. As for the federal law, according to Article
130 paragraph (2) of the 1949 Constitution of the United Republic of Indonesia,it is not possible to review
it because the federal law should not be contested (de wet is onschendbaar). However, the period of validity
of the 1949 Constitution of the United Republic of Indonesia itself was very short, between December 27,
1949 - August 17, 1950. As a result, the mechanism of judicial review contained in the constitution did not
become actualized, it remained a dead norm that was never applied in practice.
75
The judicial review institution was instituted through Law No. 14 in 1970 which in itself was the
actual result of a long process of struggle to adopt a judicial review institution in Indonesia. Before it was
officially adopted in 1970, the idea to institutionalize the mechanism of judicial review was already raised
in the sessions of the Indonesian Preparatory Committee for Preparation of Indonesian Independence
(BPUPKI) in the pre-independence period. Moh. Yamin is one of the members of BPUPKI who proposed
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limited only to reviewing legislation under the law against the law (legal review)
with the authority to conduct it being granted to the Supreme Court.76 Since that
time up to the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution in 2001, there was neither
an institution such as the one known as the Constitutional Court, neither was there
constitutional review by the Constitutional Court as we know it today.
Thus it can be concluded that, historically, the institution of judicial review was
adopted and practiced in the Indonesian legal system in 1970, when it was still at a
very limited level77 and was only regulated at the level of the law, not the constitution.78

The judicial review system in Indonesia only experienced a significant change in
2001 through the momentum of the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution.79
Through the third amendment, the official judicial review institution was included
and became one of the contents of the Constitution.80 Through the 1945 Constitution
it is determined that the judicial review system arranged therein is divided into two
separate review jurisdictions, called the dualism of the judicial review system.81 It is
regulated in Article 24A and Article 24C of the 1945 Constitution.

Article 24A sets forth judicial review conducted by the Supreme Court whose
authority is to examine legislation under the law against the law (legal review). At
the same time, Article 24C regulates judicial review conducted by the Constitutional

the idea of adopting

judicial review in the Indonesian Constitution which was then drawn up by BPUPKI.
However, Yamin’s proposal was rejected by Soepomo who did not want the inclusion of a judicial review
mechanism in the Constitution. And finally the participants agreed to the opinion of Soepomo who rejected
the idea of judicial

review so that practically the 1945 Constitution does not recognize the existence of
judicial review institutions. However, although the idea to adopt the judicial review institution ended in
the body of BPUPKI with the result of not agreeing to accommodate the idea in the 1945 Constitution, the
idea to adopt judicial review does not necessarily stop there. The idea to adopt judgment review continued
to emerge and surface in every stage in the history of the nation’s journey. And at its peak, the idea was
manifested in 1970 through the Law on the Principles of Judicial Power, albeit in a very limited degree and
form, even half-impressed, both in terms of the scope of the object and the process / testing mechanism.
For the history of debate between Yamin and Soepomo concerning judicial review, see in Mohammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 [The Preparatory Text of the 1945 Constitution], Volume
I (Jakarta: Yayasan Prapanca, 1959), pp.332-334.
76
The provisions on judicial review in Law No. 14 Year 1970 are set forth in Article 26.
77
It is considered to be limited due to the following reasons: First, the scope of review is limited to
the review of legislation below the level of law (undang-undang), or legal review. Second, the authority is
vested in an already existing judicial body, namely the Supreme Court, rather than establishing a special institution such as the Constitutional Court. Third, in practice it is difficult to implement the Supreme Court’s
authority to conduct judicial review due to the requirement that judicial review cases must be examined
in the process already taking place at the cassation level. It means that judicial review can not be filed
directly with the Supreme Court before it goes through the examination process at the first instance and
at the appeal level, while courts of the first instance and appeal courts clearly do not have the authority to
examine it. Judicial review cases are within the Supreme Court’s absolute competence hence the Supreme
Court alone has the authority to adjudicate the same. Fourth, legal norms declared invalid due to being in
contradiction with the Constitution do not automatically become void and do not automatically lose their
binding force; a specific act of revocation/cancellation by the issuing authority is required. For provisions
concerning the mechanism of judicial review which contains numerous flaws refer to Article 26 of Law No.
14 Year 1970 concerning the Basic Provisions on Judicial Power.
78
See Daniel S. Lev, Hukum dan Politik di Indonesia: Kesinambungan dan Perubahan [Law and Politics
in Indonesia: Continuity and Change], (Jakarta:LP3ES, 1990), pp.395-404.
79
The Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution was adopted by the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR)) in the Annual Assembly of MPR on November 9, 2001.
80
Jimly Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia [Constitution and Constitutionalism
in Indonesia], 2nd Print, (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2011), p.196.
81
Mahfud M. D., Perdebatan Hukum Tata Negara., p.60.
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Court whose authority is to examine the law against the constitution (constitutional
review).82
There is a long history of debate until the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution
adopted the judicial review institution with dualism system as we know it today. It
can be traced through the history of discussion of Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution
in the third amendment process in 2001.83

As the idea of institutionalizing judicial review is being “discussed” by the Ad Hoc
Committee I (PAH I)84 of the Working Body of the People’s Consultative Assembly
(Badan Pekerja Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) in the context of the amendment
of Article 24 on Judicial Power, there are at least two different opinions on the
institutionalization of judicial review within the 1945 Constitution.85 The first opinion
requires that the authority of judicial review be submitted fully to the Supreme Court.
While the second opinion requires that the authority of judicial review be submitted
and centralized on a special body outside the Supreme Court commonly referred to as
the Constitutional Court.86

The debate between the two different views seemed to be very strong as each
group was holding on to their own respective opinions. As a result, the discussion
on the amendment of Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution, in this case concerning
the institutionalization of judicial review, became difficult and did not reach an
agreement.87 Finally, as a way out to bridge the gap between the two opposing views,

Ibid.
For a more specific and comprehensive understanding of the discussions concerning the amendment of Aritcle 24 of the 1945 Constitution see Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Naskah
Komprehensif Perubahan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945: Latar Belakang,
Proses, dan Hasil Pembahasan 1999-2002, [Comprehensive Text of the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia: Background, Process and the Proceedings of Discussions
1999-2002], Book IV State Governance Authority, Volume 1, Revised Edition, Jakarta, 2010.
84
Ad Hoc Committee I or often abbreviated as PAH I is a committee consisting of 44 members of
the People’s Consultative Assembly in 1999. Ad Hoc I committee is in charge of preparing and drafting
the amendment of the 1945 Constitution from the second to fourth (2000-2002). At the beginning of its
establishment in 1999, PAH I was only assigned to prepare the draft of the People’s Consultative Assembly
Decree on the Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN). In addition to PAH I, there was also PAH II in charge
of preparing the draft of the People’s Consultative Assembly Decree Non-Outline State Policy and PAH
III in charge of preparing the draft amendment to the 1945 Constitution. However, PAH III was only in
charge of preparing the draft amendments to the 1945 Constitution for the 1999 period. As for the next
period, namely the year 2000-2002 (the second change until the fourth change), the task of preparing and
discussing the amendment of the 1945 Constitution was implemented by PAH I. For further history on the
formation and distribution of tasks among the said three Ad Hoc Committees formed by the Working Body
of MPR resulting from the 1999 General Election see in I Dewa Gede Palguna, Pengaduan Konstitusional
(Constitutional Complaint); Upaya Hukum terhadap Pelanggaran Hak-Hak Konstitusional Warga Negara
[Constitutional Complaint: Legal Recourse against Violation of Citizens’ Constitutional Rights], (Jakarta:
Sinar Grafika, 2013), p.495.
85
For a more comprehensive understanding the existence of two different opinions in the body of
PAH I BP MPR that views / determines the institution to which judicial review authority is to be granted,
refer to Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Naskah Komprehensif, pp.3-132.
86
It should be noted, however, that at this stage the idea to divide the judicial review authority into
two jurisdictions was not yet there: legal review and constitutional review were developed and agreed
upon later. It should also be noted that initially, the idea of establishing the Constitutional Court itself was
divided into three clusters. First, the Constitutional Court as part of the MPR. Secondly, the Constitutional
Court as part of the Supreme Court. Third, the Constitutional Court as an individual judicial institution.
See Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Naskah Komprehensif Perubahan Undang-Undang Dasar .....
[Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Text of Amendment to the Constitution…], Op. Cit., p.443.
87
Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Ibid.
82
83
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an alternative resolution was agreed namely that the judicial review authority would
be divided and granted to two judicial bodies, namely the Supreme Court and the
Constitutional Court.88

In the end, the term “dualism of judicial review” was the one agreed upon by the
formulators of the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. It is the formulation that
regulates the judicial review authority vested in the Supreme Court as set forth in
Article 24A paragraph (1), while regulating the authority of judicial review vested
in by the Constitutional Court as set forth in Article 24C paragraph (1) of the 1945
Constitution.
The establishment of a judicial review dualism system that continues to grant the
Supreme Court the authority to examine legislation under the law (legal review) is in
fact based on only historical and practical reasons because the authority had already
been held and practiced by the Supreme Court long before the amendment of the
1945 Constitution.89 Therefore, as the momentum of change of the 1945 Constitution
emerged, whereby one of the material changes included the institutional judicial
review system, the reality seems to have greatly affected the formulators of changes
in the Constitution in designing the judicial review system.90 As a result, formulators
of the amendment of the Constitution continue to maintain the authority of judicial
review already possessed by the Supreme Court by attaching it to Article 24A
Paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution.91

Other than the historical and practical reasons as noted above, there are other
underlying reasons on the preservation of the Supreme Court’s authority to examine
legislation under the law. The reason for this is the result of a comparative study of
the prevailing judicial review system in South Korea that adopts a dualism judicial
review system.92 As stated by Jimly Asshiddiqie who used to be a member of the Team
of Experts in the process of amendment to the 1945 Constitution, South Korea was
the object of comparison and source of inspiration for PAH I members in formulating
judicial review system in Indonesia which then we now know used a dualism system.93
As a result, the judicial review system adopted by the 1945 Constitution does

See Article 24A paragraph (1) dan Article 24C paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution.
The Supreme Court had indeed already possessed such judicial review authority since 1970
through Law No. 14 Year 1970 concerning the Basic Provisions on Judicial Power. However, the said authority was only exercised and put into practice by the Supreme Court in 1993 following the issuance of
Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 Year 1993 concerning the Right for Substantive Review (Hak Uji Materiil).
90
See Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme.
91
On this issue, Jimly Asshiddiqie puts forward a critique. According to him, the decision to maintain
the judicial review authority already possessed by the Supreme Court gives the impression that the formulation on judicial review in the Third Amendment of the 1945 Constitution is conducted in a patchy manner
as if the conception of the right to examine the material of the existing laws in the Supreme Court is not
affected by the existence of the right of review granted to the Constitutional Court. Such formulation seems
less based on the conceptual idea of judicial review itself. Jimly Asshiddiqie, Konsolidasi Naskah UUD 1945
Setelah Perubahan Keempat [Consolidation of the Text of the 1945 Constitution After the Fourth Amendment], (Jakarta: Yarsif Watampone, 2003), p.53.
92
Based on Article 107, in South Korea it is stipulated that the judicial review authority is divided into
two reviewing regimes: (i) the judicial review of the law against the constitution with the authority vested
in the South Korean Constitutional Court; and (ii) reviewing of regulations under the laws (regulations
and decisions) and or against the constitution of its competence with the authority for review granted to
the South Korean Supreme Court. It needs to be noted, however, that in South Korea all types of judicial
review can only be conducted in the framework of concrete reviews, not abstract reviews as applicable in
Indonesia. .
93
Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme.
88
89
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indeed “mimic” the system in South Korea, which divides judicial review authority
to two different bodies (Mahkamah Agung and Mahkamah Konstitusi) with testing
objects that are also different from each other.94 A judicial review system that is very
unusual in countries that adopt the establishment of the centralized judicial review
that usually centralizes all its judicial review authority to one body and does not share
it with other institutions.95
2. Dualism of Judicial Review Problems and the Proposal to Centralize the
Authority of Judicial Review to the Constitutional Court

The description above seems sufficient in providing insight into the judicial
review system that is applied in Indonesia and its comparison in general with the
judicial review system adopted by other countries. From the above description it
becomes evident that Indonesia adopts an unusual judicial review system and tends
to be inconsistent with the theory and practice of judicial review commonly applied
by other countries.96

As explained earlier, Indonesia has theoretically adopted a model of centralized
judicial review.97 The main feature of this model is centralization of judicial review
authority to only one body, in this case, the Constitutional Court. Thus according to
this model the Constitutional Court becomes the only institution authorized to uphold
the orderly hierarchy of legislation from the lowest to the highest degree.98 If there is
a violation of the hierarchy of laws and regulations then the Constitutional Court will
examine and annul any legal norms that are contrary to the constitution. The purpose
of centralizing judicial review authority on only one organ is to create consistency and
unity of law hierarchy from the lowest level of law to the constitution.99
However, with the adoption of the dualism of judicial review system by Indonesia,
the above described matters are automatically faced with obstacles and problems. The
establishment of the dualism of judicial review system has in fact caused a number
of problems within the Indonesian state administration system in general and the

See Article 24A paragraph (1) dan Article 24C paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution.
For example, of all the 11 countries which have adopted the centralized judicial review model or
who have a Constitutional Court (Austria, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Taiwan, Chile, Russia, Croatia, South
Korea, South Africa and Thailand), only South Korea has adopted the system of judicial review dualism.
The dualism of judicial review system in South Korea was then followed by Indonesia. Thus it is clear
that the system of judicial review dualism as adopted by South Korea and Indonesia seems unusual in
the environment of countries which adhere to centralized judicial review models that theoretically
and empirically do indeed want only one body to carry out the function of judicial review, namely the
Constitutional Court..
96
See again explanation on this matter in footnote number 110.
97
See for instance the writing of Donald L. Horowitz who states that “..... Indonesia have followed the
original Austrian model, devised after World War I, by creating a separate constitutional court in which the
power to review legislative and governmental action resides.” See Horowitz, “Constitutional Courts”, p. 3.
98
As an example on this matter, refer to Herbert Hausmaninger’s statement which essentially explains
that with the existence of the Austrian Constitution, normative control over all laws and regulations in
Austria is carried out (only) by the Austrian Constitutional Court. Here’s the original statement: “One
should note that in the Austrian legal system, examination of all general norms, i.e., statutes, administrative
regulations, and international treaties, as to their constitutionality or legality is monopolized by a single
institution, the Constitutional Court.” See Herbert Hausmaninger, “Judicial Referral of Constitutional
Questions in Austria, Germany, and Russia,” Paper presented in The Tulane European and Civil Law Forum,
Tulane Law School, Winter 1997, p. 2.
99
Mahfud. M. D., Perdebatan Hukum Tata Negara, p. 60.
94
95
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In connection to this, the author has identified at least three main problems due to
the application of the dualism of judicial review system in Indonesia.
First, the adoption of the dualism of judicial review system can potentially disrupt
the enforcement of the legal norm101 hierarchy as a unified system, composed of the
lowest to the highest degree of legislation.102 It is due to the fact that there are two
judicial institutions which have the authority to carry out judicial review of legislation,
namely the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. The Supreme Court conducts
review within the legal framework, while the other, the Constitutional Court carries
out the reviewing within the framework of constitutional review.103

With the authority of judicial review divided to two judicial bodies, each with its
own reviewing object and factor different from each other, the enforcement of the
hierarchy of legislation as a system is bound to become blurred, unclear, and create
double standards.104 As a result, it would be difficult (if not impossible) to enforce the
hierarchy of legislation consistently, in an integrated manner and thoroughly from the
lowest to the highest (constitution) rule since there is a dividing line between the law
enforcement hierarchy at the level of Law (Undang-undang) and the laws below the
same. As noted above, the law under the law is subject to a legal review regime within
the authority of the Supreme Court, while the law is subject to a constitutional review
regime for which the authority rests with the Constitutional Court.105
Second, the division of judicial review authority into two judicial bodies
can potentially cause problems at the implementation level. With the dualism of
judicial review system, it is possible at some point in time that the Supreme Court
and the Constitutional Court are involved in the process of reviewing two different
types of rules but have vertical linkages or relationships where the decisions of the
two institutions are different and even contradictory to each other.106 As a matter of
illustration, an instance when the Supreme Court faces a request for a judicial review
of a Government Regulation suspected to be contradictory to a law and the Supreme
Court granted it because it considers the Government Regulation to be contrary to the

100
There are many experts in Indonesia who also see the phenomenon of this dualism of judicial
review as a problem or a problematic system, such as Jimly Asshiddiqie.See further on Jimmly Asshiddiqie’s
view on the issues raised by adhering the dualism system of judicial review in in Asshiddiqie, Konsolidasi
Naskah UUD 1945, p. 53.
101
The types and hierarchies of regulations in Indonesia are clearly regulated in Article 7 of Law no.
12 Year 2011 on the Establishment of Laws and Regulations. Under this article, the types and hierarchies
of legislation consist of (from the highest to the lowest): (a) the 1934 Constitution (b) the Decree of the
People’s Consultative Assembly (c) the Laws and Government Regulations in Lieu of Law (d) Government
Regulation (e) Presidential Regulation (f) Provincial Regulation (g) Regency / Municipality Regulation (h)
and other regulations. .
102
See similar view on this matter in Mahfud M. D., Perdebatan Hukum Tata Negara, p. 60.
103
See Article 24C paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution.
104
The purpose of centralizing and uniting the authority of judicial review in one judicial body is the
very reason for the establishment of the Constitutional Court, namely to ensure the establishing the legal
hierarchy principle of law so that there is no conflict between the legal norms in the hierarchy system. And
the enforcement of the hierarchy system should ideally be done by a single organ named the Constitutional
Court in order to guarantee consistency in enforcing the hierarchy system. Thus Hans Kelsen thought when
he designed the establishment of the Austrian Constitutional Court in 1919-1920 as the first Constitutional
Court in the world. For a complete understanding, read the complete work of Hans Kelsen on this issue in
Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 2005), p.221-278.
105
See a similar view on this matter in Mahfud M. D., Perdebatan Hukum Tata Negara. Cit.
106
See a similar view on this matter in Hoessein, Judicial Review, pp.318-319.
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law in question. Meanwhile, the law that was used as the fundamental reason in the
Supreme Court’s decision was being reviewed by the Constitutional Court because
it was allegedly contrary to the Constitution and was subsequently annulled by the
Constitutional Court because the Constitutional Court considered that the law did in
fact violate the constitution.107

It means that in a system such as the dualism of judicial review, it is very
likely that the law used as the basis for the Supreme Court to review and cancel a
regulation has in fact a constitutionality problem at the same time hence it should not
be used as the basis of review.108
A situation like this is certainly an irony and a contradiction in the enforcement
of hierarchy of laws and regulations. It would not have occurred if enforcement had
been done under an integrated judicial review system and implemented by one body,
namely the Constitutional Court which was intended to establish a centralized and
exclusive judicial review (not shared with other institutions).109
The problems illustrated above have indeed occurred and are proven to exist
in the practice of reviewing the laws and regulations. One of the cases that can be
presented in this research is the case of judicial review conducted by the Supreme
Court Regulation of the General Elections Commission (KPU) No. 15 of 2009 on the
procedures for determining elected legislative members and the case of judicial
review conducted by the Constitutional Court on Law No. 10 of 2008 concerning the
Election of Legislative Members.110

In the above case, the Supreme Court subsequently cancelled several articles of
KPU Regulation No. 15 of 2009 because it was considered contrary to the provisions
of Article 205, Article 2011, and Article 212 of Law No. 8 Year 2009.111 The decision on
Ibid.
See and compare with the opinion of Janpatar Simamora who considers this matter from the point
of view of “overlap” and “mutual exclusion” between Supreme Court Decisions and Constitutional Court Decisions if both of these institutions are involved in the judicial review process of regulations of different type
and hierarchy while having a vertical relationship. See in Simamora, “Considering Centralization”, pp.27-30.
109
Hans Kelsen’s basic idea of the establishing the Constitutional Court is intended that the authority
of judicial review of all rules and legal norms is centered on one organ (the Constitutional Court). On this
subject, Hans Kelsen states as follows: “The application of the constitutional rules concerning legislation can
effectively guaranteed only if an organ other than legislative body is entrusted with the task of testing whether
a law is constitutional, and of annulling it if – according to the opinion of this organ – it’s ‘unconstitutional.’
There may be a special organ establsihed for this purpose, for instance a special court, a so called ‘constitutional court.” See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Russel & Russel, New York, 1961, p.157.
110
This judicial review, both brought before the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, stems
from a dispute over the method of distribution and determination of legislative seats resulting from the
2009 General Election between a number of legislative candidates and certain political parties with the
General Election Commission.
111
The judicial review concerning Regulation of the General Elections Commission No. 15 of 2009
was filed in several petitions by several petitioners, the verdict also consists of several decisions, namely
Supreme Court Decision. 13 P / HUM / 2009, Supreme Court Decision No. 15 P / HUM / 2009, Supreme
Court Decision No. 16 P / HUM / 2009, and Supreme Court Decision No. 18 P / HUM / 2009. In Decision
of Supreme Court No. 13 P / HUM / 2009, Article 38 paragraph (2) letter b and Article 37 letter b were examined and cancelled. In Decision of Supreme Court No. 15 P / HUM / 2009, Article 22 letter c and Article
23 paragraph (1) and (3) were tested and cancelled. In Decision of Supreme Court No. 16 P / HUM / 2009,
Article 45 letter b and Article 46 paragraph (2) letter b were tested and cancelled. While in Supreme Court
Decision. 18 P / HUM / 2009, Article 25 was tested and annulled. In principle, the said articles contain
material on the procedures for the distribution and determination of legislative seats based on the vote of
political parties in the general election of legislative members.
107
108
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cancellation by the Supreme Court was dropped on July 22, 2009.112 However, not long
afterwards, a petition was filed with the Constitutional Court to examine the articles
of Law No. 10 of 2008 which had been used as a basis by the Supreme Court to annul
the above stated KPU Regulation.113 The Petitioners alleged that the articles which
had been used as a basis for the verdict by the Supreme Court actually contained
problems in terms of constitutionality hence they had to be cancelled by the Court. In
its legal considerations, the Constitutional Court did see a problem of constitutionality
for judgment if interpreted wrongly. On that basis, the Constitutional Court declared
a “conditionally constitutional” ruling against the articles in question.114 That is, it
was declared that the articles are constitutional as long as their application follows
the interpretation and guidance given by the Constitutional Court in its decision.
Otherwise, the articles will become unconstitutional.115

From the above case we can learn and conclude that with the existence of duality
of judicial review, it is very likely that there is a contradiction of judgment regarding
judicial review issued by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.116 Referring
to the example of the case above, it is quite possible that the Supreme Court examines
and annuls a lawsuit under a law when the law itself is questionable in terms of its
constitutionality or is clearly in conflict with the constitution.
With a dualism of judicial review system, such irony can not be avoided and we
can not blame the Supreme Court for the cause of the problem. It is due to the fact
that the framework and standard of judicial review at the Supreme Court is limited to
legal review, a judicial review system that only uses the law to be reviewed against,
rather than the Constitution.117 Thus it is not possible to expect the Supreme Court
to participate in taking into consideration and to assess the constitutionality of a law
that becomes the basis for its judicial review activities, as it would be within the realm
of the authority of the Constitutional Court, rather than the Supreme Court.118

Thirdly, with the dualism of judicial review system embraced by the 1945
Constitution that separates the judicial review on the legality of regulation and the
judicial review on the constitutionality of law, it can be ensured that there is a void of
constitutional control for regulations that rank beneath the law. In short, there is no
constitutional review mechanism by the judicial body for regulations ranking beneath
the law. Because according to the 1945 Constitution only laws (Undang-Undang) can
be reviewed for their constitutionality.119 As for regulations under the law against
See Kompas, “MA Batalkan Putusan KPU,” [Supreme Court Cancels KPU Decision]. July 23, 2009:1.
The articles tested in the case of this judicial review are Article 205, Article 211, and Article 212
of Law No. 10 of 2008 concerning the Election of Legislative Members. In principle, the said articles govern
the procedures for the distribution and determination of legislative seats based on the vote of political parties in the general election of legislative members.
114
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, “Decision No. 110-111-112-113/PUU-VII/2009.”
115
See also a brief overview of the case of judicial review of Law No. 10 Year 2008 in Fritz Edward
Siregar, “The Political Context of Judicial Review in Indonesia,” Indonesia Law Review 5, No. 2 (May-August
2015): 224.
116
This concern has also been expressed by Jimly Asshiddiqie in his writings that criticize the dualism
of judicial review system in Indonesia. According to him, the dualism of judicial review system can lead to
a substantive clash between the Supreme Court’s Decisions and the Constitutional Court’s Decisions. See
further on this matter in Jimly Asshiddiqie, Konsolidasi Naskah UUD 1945, p.53.
117
Jimly Asshiddiqie, Perkembangan dan Konsolidasi Lembaga Negara Pasca Reformasi. [Development
and Consolidation of State Institutions in the Post-Reform Era]. 2nd Ed., (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2012),
p.136.
118
Ibid.
119
See Article 24C paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution.
112
113
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which they are being reviewed, review can only be done within the framework of
testing the legality; whether they are in accordance with the law or not, hence it is not
a test of constitutionality.120
The facts, in historical, theoretical, and empirical terms, have emerged from the
basic idea of judicial review which from the beginning was intended to enforce the
constitution and rule out the violations done by the existing laws under it.121 When
John Marshall and other American judges practiced judicial review for the first time in
history, it was to ensure that the contents of the constitution are strictly adhered to by
all the organs of the state and by all the laws and regulations under it.122 On the other
hand, there can be no rule in a country that is contrary to the constitution, because the
constitution is the supreme law of the land or the highest law existing in a country.123
It is clear that from the beginning that the judicial review is actually an instrument or
mechanism to enforce the supremacy of the constitution.124
The philosophy or basic idea of judicial review has been maintained up until now,
although the judicial review body has been practiced by many countries with various
models. Judicial review in theory and practice is clearly aimed at enabling examination
of all laws and regulations against the constitution so that the constitution is not
stepped over by the rules under it.125 If the rules overlap the constitution then there
will be no order and structure in a legal system.126 As briefly described by Abbe de
Siyes, “a constitution is a body of obligatory laws, or it is nothing.”127
The practices that take place in Indonesia through a dualism of judicial review
system do not allow for constitutional review of regulations under the law.128 If there
is any direct contravention of the rule under the law with constitutional material,
no judicial body may conduct judicial review of such regulation.129 In fact there are
more regulations under the law than the number of laws itself.130 Even with fewer

See Article 25A paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution.
For the history of judicial review and its underlying fundamental idea, see further in Rehnquist,
The Supreme Court, pp.21-35.
122
Finck, “Judicial Review”, pp. 123-125.
123
Ibid.
124
That is why in countries which adopt and maintain the principle of parliamentary supremacy
(rather than constitutional supremacy) such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, this judicial
review institution is not known. Because indeed in those countries the idea of constitutional reviewing,
in particular the law, is considered irrelevant and violates the principle of parliamentary supremacy that
upholds the law as a product of parliament which the judges should not test. For further explanation on
the phenomenon of non-existence of judicial review in countries upholding such parliamentary supremacy
such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, see among others in Jurgen C.A. de Poorter, “Constitutional Review in the Netherlands: A Joint Responsibility,” Utrecht Law Review 9, issue 2 (March 2013).
125
Mahfud M. D., Perdebatan Hukum Tata Negara, p.99.
126
Jimly Asshiddiqie in Hoessein, Judicial Review.
127
Abbe de Sieyes in Alec Stone Sweet, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative Perspective, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, p.35.
128
See the same view on this matter in Simamora, “Considering Centralization”, pp. 26-27.
129
See provisions of Article 24A paragraph (1) and Article 24C paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution. Neither of those articles provide for the possibility to conduct constitutional review of legislation
under the level of laws.
130
Based on data from the National Legal Development Agency of the Ministry of Justice and Human
Rights, it is noted that about 1,604 laws have been enforced in Indonesia since independence up to October 2016. While during the same period, Government Regulations and Presidential Regulations classified
as regulations under the level of law totalled 4,249 and 5,847 respectively. Not to mention the types of
regulations under other laws such as Ministerial Regulations or State Institutions Non-Ministry, Regional
Regulations, and so forth. Based on these data it is evident that the number of regulations under the law is
120
121
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laws (as opposed to regulations under the law), there are issues of constitutionality to
it. What about regulations under the law, which are not only greater in numbers than
the laws, but are also established through procedures that are not as restrictive as the
law? Hypothetically we can say that the potential of discovering problems regarding
constitutionality of such regulations is so much greater.
Therefore, it is necessary to provide a mechanism of constitutional review for
regulations so that the contents of the constitution are not only protected against
possible violations by the laws, but are also protected against potential violations
by all existing laws under the Constitution. It is important in order to uphold the
constitution as the supreme law of the land.131 After all, it is illogical that on the one
hand we close the gap of conflict between the law and the Constitution, while on
the other hand we allow a gap of conflict between the rules under the law and the
Constitution.
Such are some of the examples of problems caused by the adoption of the
dualism of judicial review system in Indonesia. These issues require appropriate
attention and solutions for the future of the judicial review system in Indonesia in
order to make it much better than it is today. So what are the steps and solutions that
can be taken in order to solve these problems?

One of the steps that can be taken in order to solve the problem is by
centralizing the judicial review authority to the Constitutional Court. By doing so, the
dualism of judicial review which is still “hampered” in the constitutional system in
Indonesia, can be terminated in order for the authority to fully review all laws and
regulations, if concentrated on one body only, namely the Constitutional Court.132

The idea of centralizing the judicial review authority into the hands of the
Constitutional Court is certainly not without reason. From a theoretical perspective
there is clearly a very strong reason why the judicial review authority should be
concentrated to the Constitutional Court. As discussed previously in the section
above, with the establishment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia
in the Third Amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the choice of legal politics actually
gave rise to the consequence that it should only be to the Constitutional Court that
the judicial review authority was institutionalized and centered to.133 In other words,
far greater than the number of laws. See Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional, “Perundang-undangan Pusat,”
[Central Laws and Regulations]. http://bphn.go.id/peraturan/perpu, accessed on October 20, 2016.
131
As John Marshall himself stated when conducting judicial review for the first time in the history,
the purpose behind it is not to maintain and enforce the constitution of possible violations committed by
the rules under it. See again about the three principal reasons of John Marshall for conducting judicial review in Mahfud M. D., Perdebatan Hukum Tata Negara, p.99.
132
In the meetings for formulating the amendment of the 1945 Constitution in the body of Ad Hoc
Committee I MPR, the Legal Expert Team chaired by Professor Ismail Sunny proposed this idea, the idea of
centralizing the judicial review authority to the Constitutional Court. However, the proposal of the Legal
Expert Team was not applied and it was proven by the institutionalization of judicial review authority
to the two judicial organs by separating the object of their respective review as set forth in Article 24A
paragraph (1) and Article 24C paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution. See Proceedings of the 11th to the
15th Meeting of PAH I Badan Pekerja MPR (April 20 – May 15, 2001) During the 2001 Session, Secretariat
General of MPR Year 2001.
133
As an example of this matter, refer to Herbert Hausmaninger’s statement which essentially explains it with the existence of the Austrian Constitution, normative control over all laws and regulations
in Austria is carried out (only) by the Austrian Constitutional Court. The original statement is quoted as
follows: “One should note that in the Austrian legal system, examination of all general norms, i.e., statutes,
administrative regulations, and international treaties, as to their constitutionality or legality is monopolized
by a single institution, the Constitutional Court.” See Hausmaninger, “Judicial Referral”, p.2.
Volume 7 Number 3, September - December 2017 ~ INDONESIA Law Review

~ 388 ~

HAMID CHALID

when the Indonesian nation agreed to establish the Constitutional Court, Indonesia
should also accept the consequence that the judicial review authority on all laws and
regulations should be entirely focused on the Constitutional Court.134 Because that is
the basic and philosophy of the establishment of the institution, namely to carry out
the function of judicial review in a centralized and exclusive manner, in a sense of no
longer being divided to other institutions outside the Constitutional Court.135

Only South Korea and Indonesia practice a system that “somewhat” deviates
from the theory and the practice of judicial review in countries that constitute
the Constitutional Court or that embrace a centralized model of judicial review by
applying a dualism of judicial review system.136 Even in countries that have their own
decentralized judicial review model, such as for instance the United States, the judicial
review authority is disseminated in the sense that it is given to all judicial organs
culminating in the Supreme Court without dividing the authority into two reviewing
regimes (legal review and constitutional review)137 as adopted by Indonesia. In other
words, once such authority is distributed to the Supreme Court and all the courts
under it, authority shall be fully granted to the said institution, in the sense that no
further division is given, in terms of the subject or the object of the review.138 This
indicates that in countries where there is a scattered judicial review system, there
has never been any division or separation of regulatory review into two reviewing
regimes as practiced by Indonesia. On the other hand, the position and role of the
Supreme Court in countries that already have a Constitutional Court is usually focused
on adjudicating law cases where its main activity is to apply the law. Meanwhile, the
position and role of the Constitutional Court is focused on trying cases of judicial
review / constitutional review where the main activity is to examine the conformity
of laws and regulations to the constitution.139 As Victor Ferreres Comella states:

“I propose that we say that the centralized model is based on a dualist structure,
for it divides the judiciary (understood in a broad sense) into two parts: “ordinary
courts”, on the one hand, and the “Constitutional Court”, on the other. It assigns
different tasks to each of them. To simplify, it assigns ordinary courts the “ordinary
judicial function”, which consists of applying legislation to decide concrete cases,
while it entrusts the Constitutional Court with the “constitutional function”,
which consists of reviewing the validity of legislation under the Constitution.”140

134
See further explanation about the consequences of concentrating judicial review authority to the
Constitutional Court of a country which has adopted the institutionalization of judicial review by forming
a Constitutional Court (centralized judicial review model) in Comella, “The Consequences of Centralizing
Constitutional Review”.
135
Hans Kelsen;s basic idea of the establishment of the Constitutional Court is intended to ensure that
the authority of judicial review of all rules and legal norms is centered on one organ (the Constitutional
Court). On this matter, Hans Kelsen states as follows: “The application of the constitutional rules concerning
legislation can effectively guaranteed only if an organ other than legislative body is entrusted with the task
of testing whether a law is constitutional, and of annulling it if – according to the opinion of this organ – it’s
‘unconstitutional.’ There may be a special organ establsihed for this purpose, for instance a special court, a so
called ‘constitutional court.” See Kelsen, General Theory, p.157.
136
See Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme, p.196.
137
See explanation on the mechanism of judicial review in general in countries which have developed
it, both those adopting decentralized judicial review as well as those applying centralized judicial review,
in Horowitz, “Constitutional Courts”.
138
See Tim Koopmans, Court and Political Institutions: a Comparative View (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), pp.34-35.
139
Comella, “The Consequences of Centralizing”, pp.2-3.
140
Ibid.
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With clear and separated formulation of tasks it is expected that there will be a
balance of execution between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court since
each of them is given different jurisdictions / competencies.141

Based on the explanation above it is clear that theoretically there is a very strong
reason to centralize the judicial review authority to the Constitutional Court. Thus
there is no theoretical obstacle to make this idea a reality. In fact, the materialization
of such idea is a pressing issue which needs to be accomplished in order to correct
the system of judicial review dualism which has been adopted and proven to cause a
number of problems.
With the centralization of judicial review authority to the Constitutional Court,
the consistency of enforcing legislation hierarchy from the lowest to the highest level
(constitution) would be more secure as there would be only one institution which
can implement it.142 Similarly, the potential of conflicts or contradictions between the
Supreme Court decision and the Constitutional Court judgment in the matter of judicial
review would l no longer exist because the judicial review authority would only rest
with the Constitutional Court. In such a way, each of the judicial organs (Mahkamah
Agung and Mahkamah Konstitusi) could focus on different areas of jurisdiction: the
Supreme Court focusing on non-judicial review cases, whereas the Constitutional
Court would be focusing on handling statutory review cases (as well as other matters
that fall within its authority according to the 1945 Constitution).143 In addition to the
above, the currently prevailing problem of vacancy or the absence of a constitutional
review mechanism against the legislation could also be eliminated as the authority
would be part of the judicial review authority held by the Constitutional Court.144
In order to materialize the idea of centralizing judicial review authority to the
Constitutional Court as proposed above, the only way that can be pursued is through
amendment of the 1945 Constitution. In this case, specifically by amendment to Article
24A paragraph (1) and Article 24C paragraph (1), bearing in mind that the provisions
regarding judicial review using the dualism system as we know it was indeed
established and sourced directly from the norms laid out in the 1945 Constitution.145

Furthermore, at the level of implementation / operation, the amendment of the
1945 Constitution which regulates the authority for judicial review must certainly be
followed by the amendment of the Supreme Court Law and the Constitutional Court
Law along with other technical regulations in order to ensure that the new system
(judicial review centered to the Constitutional Court) can be practiced fully and
correctly.

141
See similar opinion on this matter in Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme, p.196.; See
also Mahfud M. D., Perdebatan Hukum Tata Negara, p.60.
142
Ibid.
143
Other authorities outside the judicial review referred herein shall include the dissolution of political parties, disputes of authority of state institutions whose authorities are granted by the Constitution,
disputes on election results, and deciding upon alleged violations of law perpetrated by the President at
the proposal of the Parliament (impeachment) ). See Article 24C paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) of the
1945 Constitution.
144
This idea was intended to centralize the authority of constitutional review of all types of laws
and regulations to the Constitutional Court. The prevailing system still limits the constitutional review
authority held by the Constitutional Court to the law only (excluding statutory regulation). .
145
The authority of the Supreme Court to review legislation below the level of law against the law is
provided for in Article 24A paragraph (1). At the same time, the Constitutional Court’s authority to review
laws against the Constitution is provided for in Article 24C paragraph (1).
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Based on all of the foregoing analysis it can be concluded that the dualism of
judicial review system adopted by Indonesia contains a number of problems which
are the “congenital defects” of the system. Its existence in the constitutional system
in Indonesia demonstrates the existence of “accidents as well as errors of history”
because it brings together two ideas of different and contradictory judicial reviews. On
the one hand, the involvement of the Supreme Court in judicial review is characterized
as the judicial review system pioneered by the United States of America. Meanwhile,
on the other hand, the establishment of the Constitutional Court as a special body
tasked to carry out exclusive judicial review is a characteristic of the most powerful
judicial review system. Unfortunately, Indonesia mixed the two very different systems
to create a dualism of judicial review system: to accept the idea of institutionalizing

judicial review by forming the Constitutional Court while maintaining the authority of
reviewing regulations under the law against the laws already owned by the Supreme
Court.
As a result, the system that from the beginning was built on a “patchwork”
overlapping the foundation has proven to produce a number of issues that became
“homework” for the future of judicial review in Indonesia. That is why attempts
to correct the problematic dualism of judicial review system are a matter of high
urgency. One way is to concentrate / centralize the authority of judicial review of all
laws and regulations to the Constitutional Court. Endeavors to materialize such effort
must be pursued through the process of amendment of the 1945 Constitution. For
the existence of the dualism of judicial review system itself is regulated and sourced
directly from the 1945 Constitution.
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